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NOTES
Solorio v. United States: A Return To The Unrestrained Subject
Matter Jurisdiction Of Military Courts
As the U.S.S. America returns to Norfolk, Virginia after a six-month de-
ployment to the Indian Ocean, a weary sailor from Nebraska anxiously awaits
the opportunity to visit home. Once home, the sailor relaxes in an environment
free of the stress and strain of military life. While at home, the sailor and several
friends steal a car and are apprehended by the local police. According to a
recent United States Supreme Court pronouncement in Solorio v. United States,I
the sailor may be subjected to the jurisdiction of a military court for the crime.2
The Solorio decision overruled the eighteen-year-old test enunciated in
O'Callahan v. Parker3 for determining a military court's subject matter jurisdic-
tion. The O'Callahan Court established the requirement that a clime committed
by a servicemember must have a service connection before a military court's
jurisdiction would attach.4 In the example above, the crime-car theft-would
not have an adverse impact on military discipline and therefore would have had
no service connection under the O'Callahan standard. The Solorio Court re-
placed this service connection test with the requirement that the alleged perpe-
trator merely be a member of the armed services at the time of the alleged
offense,5 thus widening the reach of military courts' jurisdiction. This expansion
of jurisdiction is a return to the pre-O'Callahan standard.
This Note focuses on the scope of military courts-martial jurisdiction, rec-
ognizing that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction in many of these cases.
The Note contends that the differing results in Solorio and O'Callahan can be
understood in light of the changed circumstances affecting the judicial deference
1. 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987).
2. Under the authority of Article I of the United States Constitution, Congress enacted the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 108 (1950)(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.
§ 801-940 (1982)), and created a military courts-martial system independent of the federal judiciary
created under Article III. A court-martial administers military law, with crimes and sanctions de-
lineated by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Note, Service Connection and Drug-Related Of-
fenses: The Military Courts' Ever-Expanding Jurisdiction, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 118, 120 (1985).
3. 395 U.S. 258 (1969). In O'Callahan, a service member assaulted and attempted to rape a
young girl while he was off base on an evening pass. Id. at 259-60. O'Callahan was the first time the
Supreme Court addressed the issue of the subject matter jurisdiction of a military court-martial.
From this case emerged a line of decisions restricting the personal jurisdiction of military courts-
martial. The Supreme Court had narrowed the reach of court-martial jurisdiction to persons who
were members of the military both at the time of the offense and of the trial. See McElroy v. United
States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960) (no jurisdiction over civilian employees); Kinsella v.
United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (no jurisdiction over dependents of military
personnel); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (no jurisdiction over discharged
soldier).
4. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 272.
5. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2933.
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the Court accords to congressional authority.6 It will examine and contrast the
three factors that support application of judicial deference: the uniqueness of
the military community, the efficacy of military justice, and the constitutional
authority. Finally, the Note will discuss the effect of the ruling on ser-
vicemember rights and the issue of retroactivity of the Solorio decision.
In early 1985 a Coast Guard investigation revealed that Richard Solorio, an
active duty Coast Guardsman, while stationed in Alaska, sexually abused two
young daughters of a fellow Coast Guardsman. Solorio committed the crimes
off base, and discovery of the abuse occurred after Solorio transferred to New
York.7 A subsequent investigation revealed that Solorio had committed similar
offenses in government housing at his new duty station. The military court
charged Solorio with fourteen offenses, including rape and assault.8 At his court
martial, Solorio moved to have the Alaskan charges dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.9 The court-martial judge ruled that the Alaskan charges
were not service connected, thereby precluding court-martial jurisdiction. The
Government appealed, and the United States Coast Guard Court of Military
Review reinstated the charges upon finding that the crime's potential impact on
servicemember morale provided a service connection. 10 The United States
Court of Military Appeals subsequently affirmed the finding of jurisdiction.11
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that there was
jurisdiction. 12 Rather than applying the service connection test to find jurisdic-
tion, as did Justice Stevens,13 the majority rejected the test altogether.14
The Supreme Court considered the case an opportune one to eliminate the
confusion generated by judicial attempts at identifying a crime's service connec-
6. In this Note, judicial deference refers to the Supreme Court's reluctance to interfere in areas
in which the Constitution has empowered Congress to act.
7. United States v. Solorio, 21 M.J. 512, 514 (C.G.C.M.R. 1985), afid, 21 M.J. 251 (C.M.A.
1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 2924 (1987).
8. Solorio, 21 M.J. at 514-15. Solorio was charged with indecent liberties, lascivious acts,
indecent assault, assault, and attempted rape for acts committed in Alaska and New York under
articles 80, 128, and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 928, 934 (1982).
See Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2926 n.l.
9. Solorio objected to the military court's jurisdiction, because he claimed that the crimes
lacked a service connection under the set of factors listed in Relford v. Commandant, United States
Disciplinary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth, 401 U.S. 355 (1971). See Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2924-25.
For a discussion of the Relford factors, see text accompanying notes 39-43.
10. Soloro, 21 M.J. at 521-22. The Coast Guard Court of Military Review found that the
court-martial judge erred in analyzing the effect on the Alaskan command after both Solorio and the
victim's family had transferred. Id. The court reasoned that the proper approach in determining a
service connection is the effect the crime "would have had if discovered at the time the fathers and
the accused were assigned together .... " Id. at 519.
11. Solorio, 21 M.J. at 258. The Court of Military Appeals found a sufficient "service connec-
tion" because the alleged crimes ultimately affected "the morale of any military unit or organization
to which the [victim's] family member is assigned." Id. at 256.
12. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2931-32.
13. Id. at 2933 (Stevens, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 2927. The dissent in Solorio held fast to the O'Callahan analysis, arguing that ser-
vicemember rights to fifth and sixth amendment protection should serve to limit a military court's
jurisdiction. Id. at 2935 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Additionally, the dissent objected to the expan-
sion of jurisdiction to include offenses such as tax fraud that have no relation to military discipline.
Id. at 2941.
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tion.1 5 In rejecting the service connection test, the Solorio Court developed two
separate lines of reasoning. First, the Court found ambiguous the historical
reach of subject matter jurisdiction in early American courts-martial. 16 The
Court identified two passages from the British Articles of War of 1774. The first
required a civilian trial for soldiers accused of offenses against civilians and
property, and the second required a court-martial for similar offenses. 17 The
Court characterizes the O'Callahan Court's reliance on the former passage as
"less than accurate" in light of the contradictory passage which it precedes. 18
Second, the Court noted that the Constitution empowers Congress to make laws
regulating the military.19 Because there existed no clear historical restraint on
jurisdiction and in light of the "clear" language of the Constitution, the Court
opted to defer 20 to congressional authority in balancing the rights of ser-
vicemembers against the needs of the military.21 Thus, the Court reinstituted the
"military status" test for court-martial jurisdiction. Because Solorio was in the
Coast Guard, he was subject to the military court's jurisdiction.
During the middle ages, the use of military commanders as civilian judges
blurred any distinction between civilian and military jurisdiction.22 The origins
of the court-martial can be traced to fifteenth-century Germany.23 The court-
martial in the United States developed along the lines of the British Articles of
War existing in 1776.24 However, the extent of early American court-martial
15. Id. at 2931-32; see Relford v. Commandant, United States Disciplinary Barracks, Fort
Leavenworth, 401 U.S. 355, 365 (1971) (listing 21 relevant factors that courts could use in assessing
jurisdiction); see also Cooper, O'Callahan Revisited Severing the Service Connection, 76 MIL. L.
REv. 165, 187 (1977) (concluding that net results of the Court of Military Appeals' applications of
the service connection test were not well reasoned or logical). Compare United States v. Avila, 24
M.J. 501 (A.F.C.M.R. 1987) (servicemember's ex-wife's daughter's assault by another ser-
vicemember held not service connected) with United States v. Brenton, 24 M.J. 562 (A.F.C.M.R.
1987) (servicemember's daughter's assault by another servicemember held service connected).
16. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2930.
17. Id. at 2929 (citing British Articles of War of 1774, reprinted in C. DAvis, MILITARY LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES (3d ed. 1915)).
18. Id. at 2928.
19. Id. The Constitution states Congress shall have the power "to make Rules for the Gov-
ernment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
20. The doctrine of deference or "military necessity" was recognized in Alexander Hamilton's
THE FEDERALIST No. 23. See O'Neil, The Tenth Charles L Decker Lecture in Administrative and
Civil Law: Civil Liberty and Military Necessity-Some Preliminary Thoughts on Goldman v. Wein-
berger, 113 MIL. L. Rxv. 31, 42-43 (1986).
21. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2931.
22. J. SNEDEKER, A BRIEF HISTORY OF COURTS-MARTIAL 4 (1954).
23. See id. at 7. The use of military tribunals has been traced to the armies of Rome, although
no written codes then existed. Id. at 3.
24. See Duke & Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Army: Another Problem of Court-
Martial Jurisdiction, 13 VAND. L. Rav. 435,445 (1960). The American Continental Congress incor-
porated into the American Articles of War a provision almost identical to one in the British Articles.
Id. The Court in Solorio, however, pointed out the confusion surrounding which version of the
British Articles of War was in effect in 1776. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2929 n.6. The American Articles
of War enacted in 1776 provided:
Whenever any officer or soldier shall be accused of a capital crime, or having used violence,
or committed any offense against the persons or property of the good people of any of the
United American States, such as is punishable by the known laws of the land, the com-
manding officer and officers ... upon application duly made by or in behalf of the party or
parties injured, to use his utmost endeavors to deliver over such accused person or persons
to the civil magistrate.
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jurisdiction over military personnel who committed civilian crimes has been the
subject of scholarly debate.25 In a long line of dicta, the United States Supreme
Court stated that court-martial jurisdiction over servicemembers depended
solely on the military status of the accused.2 6 As early as 1907, the Court stated
that "the jurisdiction of general courts-martial extends to all crimes, not capital,
committed against public law by any officer or soldier .... -27 This position was
reiterated in 1960 when the Court stated that the "test for jurisdiction... is one
of status."'28 Thus, prior to O'Callahan, the Court had assumed that a military
court's subject matter jurisdiction over servicemembers had no bounds.
In 1969 the Supreme Court for the first time directly addressed the issue of
a military court's subject matter jurisdiction in O'Callahan v. Parker.29
O'Callahan, an Army sergeant, attacked a young girl in an off-base hotel and a
military court sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment. 30 O'Callahan filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging that the court-martial jurisdiction did
not extend to "nonmilitary offenses committed off-post while on evening
pass."' 31 The Court agreed with O'Callahan and established the service connec-
tion test as the basis for a military court's jurisdiction. 32
The Supreme Court premised the O'Callahan decision on three factors.
First, the Court found an historical "suspicion" of military tribunals trying
soldiers who committed civilian crimes.33 Second, the Court emphasized that
Congress' constitutional role34 in making rules governing the military must be
harmonized with principles of individual liberty expressed in the Bill of
Rights. 35 Third, the O'Callahan Court criticized the military justice system as
American Articles of War of 1776, § 10, art. 1, reprinted in W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND
PRECEDENTS, app. 10, at 964 (1920).
25. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2928-29; see also Nelson & Westbrook, Court-Martial Jurisdiction
Over Servicemen for "Civilian" Offenses: An Analysis ofO'Callahan v. Parker, 54 MINN. L. Rilv. 1,
18 (1969) ("At best, the relevant historical evidence does not provide clear guidance."). This debate
has also affected the interpretation of "original intent" regarding whether the Bill of Rights applied
to the military. See infra note 35.
26. See Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (test is one of status for court-martial juris-
diction); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (crimes traditionally triable by jury at common law
subject to court-martial jurisdiction); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 183 (1886) (any act which
brings "disgrace and reproach" upon the military is subject to court-martial); see also Gosa v.
Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 673 (1973) ("O'Callahan did not expressly overrule any prior decision, it did
announce a new constitutional principle .... ."); Nelson & Westbrook, supra note 25, at 23-24.
27. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 348 (1907).
28. Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 240-41 (1960).
29. 395 U.S. 258 (1969). One commentator criticized the Court for the timing of the decision,
stating that the result would probably have been different if the case had been decided in the next
term. At the time of the decision, Justice Fortas had resigned from the Court and Chief Justice
Warren, who joined the majority in O'Callahan, had announced his retirement. Additionally, the
judicial writings of then Circuit Judge Warren Burger were leaning toward the minority position.
See Everett, O'Callahan v. Parker-Milestone or Millstone in Military Justice, 1969 DuKE L.J. 853,
859-60.
30. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 260-61.
31. Id. at 261.
32. Id. at 272.
33. Id. at 268.
34. See supra note 19.
35. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 273. For conflicting historical interpretations of the pertinence of
the Bill of Rights to servicemembers, compare Weiner, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The
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being nothing more than an implement of discipline. 36 In light of this analysis,
the O'Callahan Court sought to protect the servicemember's constitutional right
to both a grand jury indictment and jury trial, neither of which existed in the
military justice system. Thus, the Court restricted the subject matter jurisdic-
tion of military courts by requiring the crime to have a service connection. 37 In
O'Callahan, the Court found no "flouting of military authority" in the crime
and therefore no service connection. 38
Within two years of O'Callahan, the Supreme Court refined its definition of
the service connection test. In Relford v. Commandant, United States Discipli-
nary Barracks, Fort Leavenworth,39 the Court enunciated twenty-one factors
germane to the issue of service connection. 40 Factors such as nonmilitary vic-
tims and off-base offenses weighed against finding a service connection. 41 Con-
versely, crimes that impacted troop morale or discipline weighed toward a
service connection. 42 The twenty-one factors, although not exclusive, gave form
to the ad hoc approach that had been used by the O'Callahan Court in establish-
ing the service connection test.43
Initially, the military courts narrowly applied the service connection test
and Relford factors44 in an effort to limit court-martial jurisdiction.45 Eventu-
ally, however, the military courts began to expand court-martial jurisdiction by
carving out exceptions to the O'Callahan test.46 The exceptions developed for
crimes, such as petty offenses, in which the right to a grand jury indictment or
trial by jury did not exist.47 A major expansion of court-martial jurisdiction
occurred in 1980 when the Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Trot-
tier48 reconsidered precedent that had rejected military jurisdiction over ser-
vicemember drug cases.49 The Trottier court found a service connection
Original Practice II, 72 HARv. L. Rnv. 266, 301-02 (1958) (contending that founding fathers did not
intend for the Bill of Rights to be applied to the military) with Henderson, Courts-Martial and the
Constitution: The Original Understanding, 71 HARv. L. R v. 293, 324 (1957) ("original intent" that
Bill of Rights be applied to the military).
36. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 266; see infra text accompanying notes 72-74.
37. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 272-74.
38. Id. at 274.
39. 401 U.S. 355 (1971).
40. Id. at 365, 367-69; see Spak, Military Justice: The Oxymoron of the 1980's, 20 CAL. W.L.
REv. 436, 451 (1984) (first 12 factors indicate nonservice-connected offenses and the last 9 were
additional considerations in determining the presence of service connection).
41. Relford, 401 U.S. at 365.
42. Id. at 367.
43. Id. at 365-66.
44. See, eg., United States v. Conn, 6 M.J. 351 (C.M.A. 1979) (no service connection when off-
duty military policeman used drugs in the presence of subordinates while off-base); United States v.
Heflund, 2 M.J. 11 (C.M.A. 1976) (military status of the victim not enough to create service connec-
tion); United States v. McCarthy, 2 M.L 26 (C.M.A. 1976) (not all drug offenses were service
connected).
45. Spak, supra note 40, at 453.
46. See Cooper, supra note 15, at 167-72 (O'Callahan had no application for crimes committed
overseas, on-post, or crimes of a petty nature).
47. Cooper, supra note 15, at 172.
48. 9 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1980).
49. United States v. Conn, 6 M.J. 351 (C.M.A. 1979) (use of drugs by a military officer in the
presence of subordinates not service connected); United States v. McCarthy, 2 M.J. 26 (C.M.A.
19s88] 1027
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emanating from drug abuse by reasoning that drugs presented a serious problem
affecting military discipline.5 0 The expansion of military jurisdiction continued
when one military court held that the act of forgery created a service connection
because the military victim was exposed to possible inconvenience.5 1 The flexi-
bility of the Relford factors, evidenced by courts finding service connections in
crimes affecting military discipline or service reputation, greatly expanded mili-
tary jurisdiction.5 2 Thus, by the time the Solorio case came before the Supreme
Court, the service connection barrier to court-martial jurisdiction had been sig-
nifcantly eroded.5 3
The differences in the Court's approach toward court-martial subject mat-
ter jurisdiction in O'Callahan and Solorio can best be analyzed, in light of the
doctrine of judicial deference, by a comparative analysis of the two opinions.
This analysis reveals that the eradication of factors present at the time of
O'Callahan that mitigated against judicial deference lead directly to the result in
Solorio.
Judicial deference in the context of military subject matter jurisdiction
springs from three main sources: the recognition of the uniqueness of the mili-
tary community, the efficacy of the military justice system, and the United States
Constitution. The first source, the uniqueness of the military, is derived from
the high disciplinary standards that constrain military personnel. 54 The second
source, the efficacy of the military system, is founded on the perception of the
military as being a capable arbiter of servicemember rights.5 5 The third source,
the constitutional basis of judicial deference, is explicitly addressed in Solorio.
The Supreme Court found congressional authority to regulate the military in the
"unqualified" language of the Constitution.5 6
The Court has consistently recognized the uniqueness of military life. 57
Military personnel are subject to a strict regimen so that discipline will be effec-
tive in combat situations.58 This demanding level of discipline is generally ab-
1976) (drug offense not per se "service connected"); see also Schlueter, Court-Martial Jurisdiction:
An Expansion of the Least Possible Power, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 74, 91-93 (1982).
50. Trottier, 9 M.J. at 345-48. The court stated that "almost every involvement of service per-
sonnel with the commerce in drugs is 'service connected.'" Id. at 350.
51. United States v. Lockwood, 15 M.J. 1, 9 (C.M.A. 1983).
52. Spak, supra note 40, at 454.
53. As an example of the weakening of the service connection test, compare United States v.
Conn, 6 M.J. 351 (C.M.A. 1979) (no service connection when officer used drugs in presence of
subordinates while off-base) with United States v. Trottier, 9 M.J. 337 (C.M.A. 1980) (almost any
involvement with drugs is service connected).
54. See, eg., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) ("military is by necessity a specialized
society separate from civilian society"). See generally Zillman & Imwinkelried, Constitutional Rights
and Military Necessity: Reflections on the Society Apart, 51 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 396, 401 (1976)
(status created by military membership "creat[es] rights and duties unknown in the civilian world").
55. See, eg., United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18 (1955) (military personnel
are "especially competent" to adjudicate infractions of military rules).
56. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2930; see supra note 19 for pertinent constitutional language.
57. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 360 (1980); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974).
58. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757 (1975) ("To prepare for and perform its vital
role [of fighting wars], the military must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without
counterpart in civilian life.").
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sent in civilian life.59 In addition to discipline, the servicemember may be
required to participate in the "distinctively military activity" of combat.60
Although these recognized differences existed at the time of both O'Callahan
and Solorio, the societal perception of the separation of civilian and military life
changed during the period between the two decisions.
The Supreme Court announced the O'Callahan decision during a period of
American history that found young men subject to conscriptive service and
called upon to serve in combat.61 The great influx of civilian men involuntarily
drawn into the service produced a military population more expectant of civilian
than military justice.62 The professional soldier cadr6 of the Army was being
supplemented by drafted civilians at the rate of 316,000 per year in the years
preceding O'Callahan.63 Additionally, at the time of the decision, the military
sought to bring itself into closer conformity with mainstream civilian culture.64
Thus, there existed a paradoxical situation in which the military, because of the
draft and its own initiative, was moving closer to "civilian" society at a time
when antiwar sentiments were high. The O'Callahan Court paralleled this
civilianization of the military by extending to servicemembers those rights en-
joyed by the civilian community. 65 However, by 1987, the factors that had led
to this closure between the two societies had disappeared.
In the early 1980s the military urged a return to traditional discipline.66
This return to stricter discipline came at a time when the draft had been discon-
59. Id. Several occupations, such as law enforcement and fire fighting, require members to be
subjected to life-threatening situations. These occupations are distinguishable from the military in
that refusal to follow command instruction does not involve criminal sanctions. For example, article
92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice reads: "Any person subject to this chapter who-()
violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation. . . shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct." 10 U.S.C. § 892 (1982).
60. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's Constitu-
tional Rights, 62 N.C.L. Rnv. 177, 220 (1984).
61. In the period 1966-69, an average of 316,000 men were drafted each year. Amacher, Miller,
Pauly, Tollison & Willett, The Economics of the Military Draft, in THE MILITARY DRAFr 365 (M.
Anderson ed. 1982). During that same time period, 38,530 servicemembers died as a result of enemy
action. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, table 549
(1987).
62. Cf. W. GENEROUS, SWORDS AND SCALES 29 (1973). The large influx of draftees into the
military produced a similar situation. Senator James P. Kem of Missouri stated in 1948 that "if
Congress had time to reinstate the Selective Service system, it had time to pass legislation to revise
the Articles of War." Id. Therefore, if Congress was to staff the services with draftees, it should
provide a system of justice familiar to the new recruits. Id.
63. See supra note 61.
64. E. ZUMWALT, ON WATCH 197 (1976). For example, the United States Navy, under the
leadership of Admiral Zumwalt, instituted a series of changes in the areas of Navy uniforms, per-
sonal appearance, and "demeaning and abrasive" regulations. Id. at 182-96, 530-32; see also Zillman
& Imwinkelried, supra note 54, at 400 (the military showed increasing signs of "creeping civilian-
ism" in the areas of Officer Training Programs, recruiting psychology, and salary levels).
65. Specifically, O'Callahan was concerned with the rights to indictment by a grand jury and a
trial by peers. These were the "constitutional stakes" the Court sought to protect. O'Callahan, 395
U.S. at 262.
66. See Bowling, A Return to Military Smartness and Discipline, PROCEEDINGS, June 1981, at
48 (recognizing that the political climate was "propitious" for reinstatement of traditional disci-
pline); see also Paolantonio, Not In My Navy, PROCEEDINGS, Aug. 1982, at 41 (Navy adopted a "get-
tough" policy with drug abusers abandoning the past "bleeding liberal heart" approach).
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tinued.67 The elimination of the draft produced, at least theoretically, a recruit
predisposed to the military lifestyle.68 The combination of a volunteer military
with the fading antimilitary sentiments restored the "credibility" 6 9 of the mili-
tary as a distinct social group. The distinction between military and civilian soci-
eties had grown stronger by the time of the Solorio decision.
The Solorio Court recognized the difference in the two societies by focusing
on military discipline.70 The effect of a civil court's intrusion upon military au-
thority concerned the Court.71 Thus, a shift in focus from the effect of jurisdic-
tion on servicemember rights in O'Callahan to the effect of jurisdiction on
military discipline in Solorio mirrors the shift in the military away from civilian
standards.
A second source of judicial deference to congressional authority in regulat-
ing the military emanates from the efficacy of the military court system in pro-
viding justice. The need for "special regulations" and an "exclusive system of
military justice" is a derivative of the uniqueness of the military society.72 The
O'Callahan Court was broadly critical of military courts. Specifically, the Court
criticized a court-martial's lack of jury by peers, the questionable objectivity of
the presiding judge, and the military tribunal's inability to handle the "subtleties
of constitutional law."' 73 Justice Douglas described the court-martial as an "in-
strument of discipline, not justice."' 74 At the same time, Congress identified sim-
ilar problems in the military judicial system. Led by Senator Sam Ervin,
Congress approved the Military Justice Act of 1968,75 which became effective
sixty days after the O'Callahan decision was issued.76 The Act corrected some
of the deficiencies cited by the O'Callahan Court.77
The Solorio Court's approach to identifying the proper judicial forum for
67. Although the draft has been discontinued, young men between the ages of 18 and 26 have
been required to register with the selective service system since 1980. See Proclamation No. 4771, 3
C.F.R. § 82 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 453 (1987).
68. Cf. Zillman & Imwinkelried, supra note 54, at 397 (educated draftees, a Vietnam conflict
"phenomenon," were shocked by military practices).
69. See President Reagan, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 1984), reprinted in ADMINIS-
TRATION OF RONALD REAGAN 1984, Book 1, 87, 88.
70. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2931. The Court quoted Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305
(1983) (quoting Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 181, 187 (1962),
which had stated that civilian courts are " 'ill equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that
any particular intrusion upon military authority might have' ").
71. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2931.
72. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300 (1983).
73. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 263-66.
74. Id. at 266 (quoting Glasser, Justice and Captain Levy, 12 COLUM. F. 46, 49 (1969)).
75. Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968).
76. W. GENEROUS, supra note 62, at 185-98. The resort to "judicial activism" is normally
reserved for areas in which the legislature has been slow to act. In O'Callahan, the concept ofjudicial activism appears inapplicable, because Congress acted by passing the Military Justice Act of
1968. Nelson & Westbrook, supra note 25, at 60.
77. The Military Justice Act of 1968 affected six major areas of military law: counsel, military
judges, procedures, command influence, summary courts-martial, and postconviction procedures.
See Kaczynski, From O'Callahan to Chappell: The Burger Court and the Military, 18 U. RICH. L.
Rv. 235, 279-82 (1984). See generally Quinn, Some Comparisons Between Courts-Martial and Ci-
vilian Practice, 15 UCLA L. REv. 1240 (1968) (while military courts were civilianizing, civilian
courts were adopting some of the procedural safeguards already employed by the military).
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adjudicating cases involving military personnel stood in stark contrast to that
used in O'Callahan. Although the Solorio Court did not specifically address the
efficacy of military courts, a certain judicial deference can be found by negative
implication. The Court spoke of the civil courts' ineffectiveness in adjudicating
matters of "military concern."'7 8 One explanation offered was that the judiciary
is not trained to address problems peculiar to the military.7 9 The Solorio Court's
silence as to the efficacy of military justice provides at least tacit approval of the
effectiveness of military courts in guaranteeing the rights of servicemembers.
The primary factor distinguishing Solorio and O'Callahan is the interpreta-
tion the Supreme Court accorded the Constitution in each case. The O'Callahan
Court, suspicious of military justice, sought to protect servicemember rights.80
The Supreme Court decided O'Callahan in an era of civil strife and social up-
heaval. 81 This concern for individual liberties was reflected in the Court's "in-
creasing awareness and recognition of the important constitutional values
embodied in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments."'82 The O'Callahan Court pre-
mised its decision on a restrictive historical view of military jurisdiction and on
its general pronouncement that the military is "singularly inept" at resolving
constitutional issues.83
Unlike O'Callahan, the Solorio Court did not focus on constitutional rights,
but rather on the proper overseer of such rights. The Court found specific gui-
dance in the Constitution, which empowers Congress "[t]o make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces .... ",84 The Solorio
Court found the "plain" meaning" of the Constitution applicable, thereby al-
lowing military court jurisdiction to attach to all crimes committed by ser-
vicemembers and expunging the service connection requirement.85 The Court
did not address the requirements of the fifth and sixth amendments. Instead,
Chief Justice Rehnquist indicated that the responsibility for balancing ser-
vicemember rights with military requirements rested with Congress. 8 6 Finding
only an ambiguous history of court-martial jurisdiction, the Court concluded
78. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2931.
79. Warren, supra note 70, at 187; see also United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18
(1955) ("military personnel... may be especially competent to try soldiers for infractions of military
rules").
80. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
81. Kaczynski, supra note 77, at 276-78; see also S. AMBROSE, RISE TO GLOBALISM 298-99 (3d
ed. 1983) (street riots and persistent racism in the 1960s made American foreign policy suspect and
led to an "examination of all aspects of American life").
82. Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 674 (1973). The Warren Court, which decided O'Callahan,
in many ways mirrored the social consciousness of the 1960s and used judicial activism to "reshape
constitutional law in an evolving society." Schwartz, Earl Warren AsA Judge, 12 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 179, 179 (1985). On the other hand, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts have reflected a more
conservative era and acted to limit the scope of some of the Warren Court's decisions. Amelia,
Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideolo-
gies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 192-94 (1983).
83. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 265.
84. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
85. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2930.
86. Id. at 2931. Chief Justice Rehnquist had long advocated the repeal of the service connec-
tion test. See, e.g., Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 692 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)
("O'Callahan, was, in my opinion, wrongly decided, and I would overrule it ... ").
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that any restriction of the plain language of the Constitution was unjustified.87
The differences in constitutional approach between O'Callahan and Solorio
illustrate the changed attitudes of the Court and help explain the result in
Solorio. The Solorio Court shifted the focus of inquiry from the infirmities of the
military system to those of the civil courts. 88 This shift in focus changed the
emphasis from protection of servicemember rights to preservation of the military
justice system.89 Additionally, the factors existing in 1969, such as social unrest
and the large conscripted military, which tended to de-emphasize the doctrine of
judicial deference, had declined in importance by the time of the Solorio
decision.
The increasing breadth of military courts' subject matter jurisdiction ef-
fected by the Solorio decision is not, however, an evisceration of servicemember
rights. Although the "constitutional stakes" 90 of fifth and sixth amendment
rights that the O'Callahan Court found central were not addressed in Solorio,
several factors exist which mitigate the impact of the decision on individual
rights. First, the loss of a grand jury in the wake of Solorio is somewhat illusory.
The Supreme Court has yet to overrule Hurtado v. California,9 1 which held that
the fourteenth amendment does not require a grand jury indictment as a matter
of due process. Thus, a servicemember or civilian in a state court may not be
assured of indictment by a grand jury.92 Second, although a servicemember may
have had access to a jury trial under O'Callahan if the crime was not service
connected or if he is tried in a state court, the use of a jury may have exposed
him to local prejudices against the military.93
Further, the deference to congressional authority represents an abdication
of the Supreme Court's role in reviewing cases that involve servicemember
rights. Rather than routinely decreeing judicial deference, the dissent in
Goldman v. Weinberger94 urged that there should be a "rational foundation" for
87. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2930.
88. Id. at 2931. The Court stated that civil courts are "ill-equipped" to determine the effect
that civil intrusion upon military authority will have on military discipline. Id.
89. Compare O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 261-62 (the fifth and sixth amendment rights are the
"constitutional stakes in the present litigation"), with Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2932 ("confusion created
by the complexity" of the service connection test has caused much time and energy to be expended
on litigation).
90. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 262.
91. 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (fourteenth amendment due process does not require indictment by
grand jury).
92. Everett, supra note 29, at 864-65.
93. Everett, supra note 29, at 865. In his article Robinson Everett-the current Chief Judge on
the Court of Military Appeals- illustrates the point by stating that a servicemember is probably not
a native of the community where he is to be tried. Additionally, the residents of the community may
harbor resentments about the military presence in their community. This is especially true when
there is a small community adjacent to a large military base. Cf. R. EVERETT, MILITARY JUSTICE IN
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES 5-6 (1956) (military court-martial panel more aware
of the pressures affecting a servicemember than a civilian jury); Wilkinson, The Narrowing Scope of
Court-Martial Jurisdiction: O'Callahan v. Parker, 9 WASHBURN L.J. 193, 207-08 (1970) (ser-
vicemember peers logically are other servicemembers). But see Note, Service-Connection and Drug-
Related Offenses: The Military Courts' Ever-Expanding Jurisdiction, 54 Gro. WASH. L. Rnv. 118,
122-25 (1985) (lack of jury trial for servicemembers is a serious constitutional deprivation).
94. 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
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applying the principle of deference. 95 Without a critical analysis of the need for
deference, the servicemember must rely on the "vagaries of military control." 96
Recognition of the principle of judicial deference places a premium on mili-
tary exigencies and subordinates individual rights. The Supreme Court applied
the doctrine ofjudicial deference in several cases prior to Solorio. These included
cases that involved free speech,97 religious freedom, 98 and sex discrimination.9 9
The Solorio decision has reinforced the Court's propensity for deference and
presents a large obstacle for future cases involving the vindication of ser-
vicemember rights.
It seems unlikely that retroactive application of Solorio will resurrect many
foregone court-martials. The courts are not faced with the same problems as
those presented when the Supreme Court denied retroactivity in O'Callahan.100
The O'Callahan decision narrowed jurisdiction and opened the door to appeals
for courts-martial that had involved civilian crimes. 10 Additionally, by the
time of the Solorio decision, the military courts were giving broad application to
the service connection test. Thus, cases the military would be most interested in
prosecuting, those affecting military discipline, would have previously satisfied
the service connection test.
The military courts have had two opportunities to rule on the retroactive
application of Solorio. The Army Court of Military Review allowed retroactive
application in United States v. Starks,10 2 decided thirty-four days after the
Solorio decision. The Starks court reasoned that the new status test was "a new
rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions" and therefore retroactivity ap-
plied to "all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final
.... 103 Two days before Starks, the highest military court, the Court of Mili-
95. Id. at 1321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. Solorio, 107 S. Ct. at 2941 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (court-martial involving a military doctor who told
black servicemembers that they should refuse to serve in Vietnam).
98. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (Air Force officer brought suit claiming that
an Air Force regulation forbidding the wearing of headgear indoors infringed on his first amendment
freedom to exercise religion by wearing a yarmulke).
99. Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (suit challenged the military Selective Service Act
which authorized only males to register).
100. In Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973), the court, rejecting retroactivity, stated that retro-
active application of O'Callahan would "result in adjustments and controversy over back pay, veter-
ars' benefits, retirement pay, pensions, and other matters." Id. at 683.
101. A prime example of the wide doors that would have been opened if O'Callahan had been
applied retroactively is the companion case to Gosa-Flemings v. Chafee, 330 F. Supp. 193
(E.D.N.Y. 1971), aft'd, 458 F.2d 544 (2d Cir. 1972), rev'd sub nom. Gosa v. Mayden 413 U.S. 665
(1973). In Flemings a sailor during World War II stole a car while on an unauthorized absence and
was court-martialed. In 1970, after O'Callahan, the ex-sailor attempted to have the court-martial
overturned and the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York retroactively
applied O'Callahan's service connection test. Flemings v. Chafee, 330 F. Supp. 193 (E.D.N.Y.
1971). The Supreme Court in Gosa rejected retroactive application of O'Callahan, citing controver-
sies over "back pay, veterans' benefits, retirement pay, pensions and other matters" that would de-
velop if convictions failed for lack of jurisdiction. Gosa, 413 U.S. at 683.
102. 24 M.J. 857 (A.C.M.R. 1987). Although it allowed retroactive application, the court
hedged its decision by also finding a service connection. Id. at 859.
103. Id.
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tary Appeals, found a service connection in United States v. Overton."14 The
Overton court only mentioned in a note that the same result would have issued
by applying Solorio.Y'5
Although retroactive application of Solorio would not create serious
problems in increasing the military court's caseload, the expanded jurisdiction
will clearly do so. 10 6 The increased jurisdictional reach provides the military
with the capability to pursue servicemembers for a wide spectrum of crimes,
including tax evasion.107 However, this capability will have to be balanced
against the concomitant increases in military court congestion, lawyer caseload,
and court expense.
Differences in the social and political landscape over the past twenty years
have influenced the factors underlying judicial deference to the subject matter
jurisdiction of military tribunals. The restricted military jurisdiction resulting
from O'Callahan was a response to the times. With Solorio, the Court has re-
turned to a "hands off"'10 8 approach to the military justice system. By cloaking
all servicemember crimes with court-martial jurisdiction, the Court has left mili-
tary justice to the military system. The resultant effect on servicemember rights
will depend on both the efficacy of the military courts in carrying out justice and
congressional oversight of the process. The judicial mechanism that Justice
Douglas described as "singularly inept" at safeguarding constitutional free-
doms 09 has had its grasp enlarged by Solorio.
ALBERT N. CAVAGNARO
104. 24 MJ. 309 (C.M.A. 1987).
105. Id. at 312.
106. Although there is disagreement as to the effect on military caseload that Solorlo will create,
the decision may induce civilian law enforcement officials to turn over cases to the military. Navy
Times, July 6, 1987, at 30, col. 1.
107. R. EvRETr, supra note 93, at 68-69.
108. Warren, supra note 70, at 187.
109. O'Callahan, 395 U.S. at 265.
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